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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the district 
court granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. This court has 
jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to section 78-2-2 (3) (i), 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue for review is whether the trial court erred in 
granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and in not granting 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The issue to be 
determined by this court is whether there was an unconstitutional 
denial of equal protection of the law under statutes governing 
the Utah State Retirement Office which allowed Plaintiffs to 
contribute to the State Retirement Office on both their primary 
and secondary income, but preclude the State Retirement Office 
from including secondary income when determining retirement 
benefits. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remedies 
before the Utah State Retirement Board. The case was filed as a 
class action in the third judicial district court. The case was 
heard by the Honorable James S. Sawaya June 8, 1987, on 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss. The trial court entered judgment for 
Defendant on June 29, 1987, and Plaintiffs appealed on July 29, 
1987. From an order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
(treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment), Plaintiffs appeal. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Unless otherwise required for clarification, statutory 
citations are to Utah law, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted 
at the time this action was filed. Several of the statutes have 
been amended several times during the period for which refunds 
may be claimed, and the amendments may affect classes of members 
differently. 
Plaintiffs brought this action as a class action alleging 
that they were appropriate representatives of a class and should 
be certified as a class under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
In their First Amended Complaint Plaintiffs alleged that 
they paid to the Defendant retirement contributions on both their 
primary and secondary income, that they paid at a higher rate 
than employees similarly situated, and that state law prohibited 
including their contribution on the secondary income in 
determining retirement benefits. (R. 11-13) 
Plaintiffs also alleged that there was "no basis in law or 
fact for the different treatment of Plaintiffs except that they 
paid a higher contribution rate than other members of the State 
Retirement System who did not contribute at the higher rate.11 
(R. 13) 
Plaintiffs also alleged that they paid monies to the State 
Retirement Board based on their secondary income which the law 
did not require them to make, and that the amounts were paid by 
mistake and were paid to Defendant for the benefit of Defendant 
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and not Plaintiffs. (R.14) No evidence was presented on this 
claim and Plaintiff made no motions with regard to the claim. 
Plaintiffs1 third claim was based on unjust enrichment. As 
with the second claim, no evidence was presented on this claim 
and Plaintiff made no motions with regard to the claim. 
Defendant responded to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint by a 
Motion to Dismiss. The trial court treated Defendants1 Motion to 
Dismiss and the Affidavits attached thereto as a Motion for 
Summary Judgment under Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The Utah State Retirement System ordinarily receives 
payments from individuals and the individual's employers as a 
percentage of the individual's primary income. For school 
teachers, the primary income is the classroom teacher's regular 
salary. Any other income for extra services such as career 
ladder, coaching, or coaching debate is considered secondary. 
The secondary income has been included in some teachers' 
compensation for purposes of determining their contribution rate 
to the state retirement system, but not others. The retirement 
benefit is based on the final average salary of the member. 
"Final average salary" is defined in section 49-10-6 (21) to 
allow secondary income to be included in the contribution rate, 
but sections 49-9-17 and 49-9-18 preclude the inclusion of any 
income other than primary income in calculating the retirement 
benefit. The statutes were in conflict. In all cases, the State 
Retirement Board has refused to include the secondary income to 
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calculate the "final average salary." In this case, Plaintiffs 
alleged that they paid contributions based on both their primary 
and secondary incomes, but the State Retirement Office did not, 
until the 1985 amendments to the state retirement act, include 
secondary income in calculating retirement benefits. 
Plaintiffs1 claims may be illustrated in two ways: 
A. Teacher A earns an annual basic salary of $18,000 and 
$2,000 for the merit pay (or coaching debate). Teacher B earns 
an annual salary of $18,000, but no additional pay. Teacher A 
contributes 12% on $20,000; Teacher B contributes $12% on 
$18,000. If both teachers retire the next year, teacher A's 
benefit is calculated using the $18,000 salary, and Teacher B's 
retirement benefit is calculated on the basis of the $18,000 
salary. 
B. Teacher A earns an annual basic salary of $18,000 and 
$2,000 for the merit pay (or coaching debate). Teacher B earns 
an annual salary of $20,000, but no additional pay. Teacher A 
contributes 12% on $20,000; Teacher B contributes $12% on 
$20,000. If both teachers retire the next year, teacher A's 
benefit is calculated using the $18,000 salary, and Teacher B's 
retirement benefit is calculated on the basis of the $20,000 
salary. 
The different treatment accorded Plaintiffs is unlike a tax 
in that individuals participating in the Utah State Retirement 
System contribute to their own account. Their benefit is 
determined based on the number of years contributing to the 
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system and averaging their three or five highest years of 
compensation. The system does not tax the highest paid employees 
for the benefit of others; the system is a retirement program, 
not an income distribution plan. See former section 49-10-32, 
presently enacted as 49-2-402. 
On June 22, 1983 (R. 41) and again on November 8, 1984 (R. 
43-45), the Utah State Retirement Board adopted resolutions in 
which it defined income for purposes of determining the amount of 
the contribution to the state retirement fund and determined that 
the amount was to be based on the person's primary job. Secondary 
income was to be excluded. Both resolutions allowed the member 
to request a refund of amounts paid to the state retirement 
system on the secondary income. 
On May 16, 1985, the State Retirement Board adopted a 
resolution terminating the right of members to request refunds of 
the contributions paid to the retirement system on the secondary 
income. (R. 46) Prior to May 16, 1985, several members had 
requested and received a refund under the resolutions of June 22, 
1983 and November 8, 1984. 
In 1985, the Utah Legislature enacted H.B. No. 299 which 
adopted the Social Security definitions of income for purposes of 
determining "income" on which retirement contributions are 
calculated and uses the same basis for calculating retirement 
benefits. The 1985 act eliminated much of the problem created by 
the earlier laws and practices of the state retirement system, 
but Plaintiffs could not take advantage of the change of law 
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without retiring, and the State Retirement Office has refused to 
give any refunds for the class Plaintiffs represent. 
Section 49-10-1, provided in part that it is state policy 
"that contributions shall be taken on total salaries and earnings 
in covered employment of all members, participants; . . . " 
Section 49-10-6 provided in part: 
(22) "Compensation," "salary" or "wages" means the total 
amount of payments made by an employer to an employee, for 
services rendered to the employer, including, but not by way 
of limitation, all salary, wage and overtime payments, but 
excluding the monetary value of remuneration paid in kind, 
such as residence or use of equipment and all contributions 
made by an employer under this plan or under any other 
employee benefit plan maintained by an employer for the 
benefit of a participant. 
(23) "Final average salary" means the rate of the average 
highest annual compensation payable to a member for any five 
years preceding retirement. For purposes of computing the 
member's final average salary only, the member is considered 
to have been in service at his last salary rate from the 
date of the termination of employment to the date his 
retirement becomes effective if the member so requests. If 
participating service is less than five years, then "final 
average salary" means the average annual compensation paid 
to the member during the full period of participating 
service. It does not include for any member compensation 
received for either part-time or special service rendered in 
conjunction with full-time employment unless contributions 
have been paid on compensation received for such additional 
service. The "final average salary" is limited in the 
computation of that part of a member's prior service 
retirement allowance based on service rendered during a 
period when the said member received employer contributions 
on a portion of his compensation from an educational 
institution toward the payment of the premium required on a 
retirement annuity contract with the Teachers' Insurance and 
Annuity Association of America or with any other public or 
private system, organization or company to $4,800. This 
limitation is not applicable to members who elected to 
continue in the state retirement system by July 1, 1967. 
The retirement board shall, before July 1, 1979, adjust the 
retirement allowance of any member who retired before July 
1, 1979. "Average final monthly salary" means one-twelfth 
of the final average salary. 
6 
(28) "Contributions" means the contributions by both the 
employing units and the members into the retirement fund. 
(29) "Accumulated contributions" of a member means the sum 
of the contributions made by or on behalf of a member and 
standing to the credit of his individual account together 
with regular interest thereon. 
Section 49-10-32 provided in part: 
Upon . . . retirement of a member . . . he shall receive 
retirement allowance which shall consist of an annuity, a 
pension based on his prior service and a pension based on 
his current service, the total of which shall be determined 
as follows: 
(a) If the member has attained the age of 65 years, his 
retirement allowance shall be: 
(1) An amount equal to 1.10% of his final average monthly 
salary, multiplied by the number of years of service 
credited to him for service rendered prior to July 1, 1967; 
plus 
(2) An amount equal to 1.25% of his final average monthly 
salary multiplied by the number of years of service credited 
to him for service rendered on and after July 1, 1967, 
through June 30, 1975; plus 
(3) An amount equal to 2% of his final average monthly 
salary multiplied by the number of years of service credited 
to him for service rendered on and after July 1, 1975. 
In no case may that part of a retiring memberfs allowance, 
based upon prior service, as provided in subsection (a) (1) 
of this section, be less than 1.15% of his final average 
monthly salary if his final average monthly salary is $500 
or less, multiplied by the number of prior service years 
standing to his credit at retirement. 
Section 49-9-17 provided: 
In the administration of the state retirement 
systems assigned to the Utah State Retirement Office 
for administration, the following policies apply: 
(a) Final average salary used in the computation of a 
retirement benefit shall be based upon the fixed 
compensation regularly paid to the member over the period of 
time specified in the retirement system act under which the 
benefit is being computed. It shall not include overtime, 
double time, or (underlined portion was deleted in 1985) 
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terminal lump-sum payments, accumulated lump-sum vacation or 
sick leave payments, severance pay, bonuses, or any other 
special payments including early retirement inducements, 
except as provided to the contrary in the laws governing the 
separate retirement systems, nor shall the contributions 
paid by the employer and employee to the retirement systems 
be based upon any of the aforementioned special payments in 
the last year of service. 
(b) This policy on the computation of final average salary 
shall take precedence over any and all definitions of final 
average salary included in any and all state retirement 
system acts administered by the Utah State Retirement 
Office. 
Section 49-9-18 provided: 
Should a conflict, discrepancy or inconsistency appear 
between this act and the statutory language relating or 
incident to any retirement system or funds assigned to the 
board to administer, this act, as far as practicable, shall 
take predominance. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to a refund of the 
money they paid to the Utah State Retirement Office during the 
time the statutes prohibited them from benefiting from the higher 
contribution rate they paid to the Utah State Retirement Office 
based on their secondary income. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND IN NOT GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY Judgment FOR THE REASON THAT ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS TO 
CONTRIBUTE TO THE STATE RETIREMENT OFFICE ON BOTH THEIR PRIMARY 
AND SECONDARY INCOME WHILE CALCULATING BENEFITS ONLY ON THE BASIS 
OF PRIMARY INCOME CONSTITUTES A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION. 
In this case, Defendant did not file an answer, but moved to 
dismiss. Under Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Plaintiffs' allegations are admitted. For purposes of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' 
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allegations must be taken as true. 
The section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States provides: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges of immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
The clause requires that state governments treat similarly 
situated individuals in a similar manner. Constitutional Lawf 
Nowak, Rotunda & Young (1978), p. 383. 
16A Am Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, section 751 provides in 
part: 
Standards by which the reasonableness of statute's 
classification is to be measured are (1) all 
classifications must be based upon substantial 
distinctions which make one class really different from 
another; (2) the classification adopted must be germane 
to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification must 
not be based upon existing circumstances only and must 
not be so constituted as to preclude additions to the 
numbers included within a class; (4) to whatever class 
a law may apply, it must apply equally to each member 
thereof; and (5) the characteristics of each class 
could be so far different from those of other classes 
as to reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having 
regard to the public good, of substantial different 
legislation. 
The constitutional test of equal protection is that of 
reasonableness of classification. Iowa National Mutual Insurance 
Company v. City of Osawatomie, 458 F.2d 1124 (10th Cir. 1972). A 
statute which denies to some that which it grants to others of 
the same class violates the equal protection provisions of the 
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federal constitution, unless the deprivation is suffered as a 
result of the state placing persons into different classes, and 
the classification is reasonable. Gilmore v. Greene County 
Democratic Party Executive Committee, 435 F.2d 487 (11th Cir. 
1970). 
A statute violates equal protection when it results in 
discrimination against a certain class, and the classification is 
not rationally related to any legitimate state policy or 
interest. Hawkins v. Moss. 503 F.2d 1171 (4th Cir. 1974), cert 
den. 420 U.S. 928. 
A person can mount an equal protection challenge on the 
grounds that the government has chosen to treat differently 
persons who are similarly situated. Carpenters 46 County 
Conference Board v. Construction Industry Stabilization 
Committee, 393 F.Supp. 480 (D.C.Cal. 1975). 
In Household Finance Corporation v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 177 
(Del. Super. 1975), the Delaware court held that the judicial 
method of review of statutory classifications under the rational 
basis test involved, initially, an examination of the statute to 
determine whether the subject was of permissible and legitimate 
state concern , and second, whether the statute, the means to 
effect the end, is a reasonable tool for that purpose. In the 
present case, there is no showing of the state's purpose or that 
there is a reasonable purpose for the double standard. Indeed, 
Defendant's initial response to the trial court was to admit that 
the definitions of "compensation" and "final average salary" 
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appeared to be "inadequate if not inconsistent and perhaps 
unfair, particularly in light of recent provisions for educators 
In People v. Ditniak, 299 N.Y.S. 2d 593 (1969), the court 
held that equal protection is denied when all persons in the same 
class are not treated alike under like circumstances and 
conditions, both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. 
Legislation which singles out one of a class for special burdens 
and obligations, subjecting him to certain liabilities from which 
all others are exempted, denies equal protection of the laws. 
If a classification does not rest on differences between 
classes which bear a fair, substantial, natural, reasonable and 
just relation to the object of the legislation, then it violates 
equal protection. Id. 
In Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D.C. Conn. 1967), 
afffd. 394 U.S. 618, the court held that where government confers 
advantages on some, it must, in order not to deny equal 
protection, justify its denial to others by reference to a 
constitutionally recognized reason. 
Plaintiffs submit that they, as a class, have been singled 
out for certain liabilities with no corresponding benefit. The 
sole distinction between them and other individuals is that some 
of their income was paid for extra work for which they were 
compensated in addition to their regular compensation. Had the 
compensation been paid as part of their regular salary, they 
would have been entitled to the benefits of the higher 
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compensation. There is no rational basis for distinguishing 
contribution rates based on the higher income while refusing to 
calculate retirement benefits on the higher income. 
In Lynn v. Kootenai County Fire Protective Dist. No. 1, 97 
Idaho 623, 550 P.2d 126 (1976), the Idaho legislature enacted an 
amendment to the Idaho Code relating to "Pension payment — 
Retirement of incapacitated fireman after five years" which 
provided that if a fireman had 21 or more years of service, the 
monthly sum due a claimant would be the same amount as was 
payable in cases of voluntary retirement. The court held that 
the amendment violated the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in that it resulted in firemen with less 
service receiving more benefits and in firemen with like periods 
of service but with different retirement dates receiving more 
benefits than firemen with 21 or more years of service. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs submit that they have been denied equal 
protection of the laws in that they have contributed to the State 
Retirement Fund at a higher rate than others similarly situated, 
and that while they contributed to the retirement system based on 
the higher rate of pay, state law prohibited a portion of their 
higher income from being calculated in their retirement benefit. 
Prior to the 1985 amendments, sections 49-9-17 and 49-9-18 
violated the equal protection clause of the United State 
Constitution in that there was no rational basis for creating a 
class which contributed to the state retirement fund at a higher 
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rate than did other members of the same class for the same 
benefits. 
This Court should reverse the lower court and hold that the 
Plaintiffs have been unconstitutionally denied equal protection 
of the laws and allowed at their election either to have their 
excess contribution refunded together with interest or to have 
their excess contribution included in calculating their final 
average salary for purposes of retirement benefits. The case 
should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of the 
amounts the Plaintiffs and the class they represent are entitled 
to claim. 
DATED this 8th day of December, 1987. 
#L ,. s 
MICHAEL T. MCCOY 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I cause to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct two copies of the foregoing Appellants' Brief 
on Appeal to Mark Madsen, Attorney for the Utah State Retirement 
Board, 540 East 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and to 
David Wilkinson, Utah Attorney General, Utah State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112 this 8th day of December, 
1987. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NICK FRANKLIN, MIKE FURNESS, 
DARYL SIMMONS, aka WHITE D. 
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JACK D. GARDNER, DAVID C. 
JOHNSON, and KURT ROBERTS, 
on behalf of themselves and 
all other members of the Utah 
Education Association similarly 
situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
Defendant. 
The above entitled matter came on regularly to be heard 
before the Court on Monday, the 8th day of June, 1987, on defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss and upon plaintiff's Motion for Certification as a 
Class Action and for Partial Summary Judgment, wherein Michael T. McCoy 
appeared for plaintiffs and Mark A. Madsen appeared for defendant. 
3rd Dtst. Court 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. C86-1987 
(Hon. James S. Sawaya) 
The Court having examined 
having heard the arguments of respe< 
advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
with prejudice for failure to state 
granted. 
Dated this SV day of 
the files and records herein and 
tive counsel, and being fully 
plaintiff's complaint be dismissed 
a claim upon which relief can be 
June, 1987. 
-2-
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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. C86-1987 
w • • • 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1- Each plaintiff, upon fulfillment of statutory requirements, is 
entitled to a retirement benefit based upon his final average salary 
multiplied by the number of years of service credited to him. 49-10-32, 
U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
2- Prior to March 16, 1985, "final average salary,11 by statutory 
definition in the system covering plaintiffs, did not include com-
pensation received for either part-time or special service rendered 
in conjunction with full-time employment unless contributions to the 
retirement system were paid on compensation received for such addition-
al service. 49-10-6(23), U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
3- Prior to March 16, 1985, in the general provisions of the 
retirement statutes governing all retirement systems "final average 
salary" did not include overtime, double time, or terminal lump sum 
payments, accumulated lump-sum vacation or sick leave payments, sever-
ance pay, bonuses, or any other special payments including early 
retirement inducements, nor were contributions paid by the employer 
and employee to the retirement systems to be based upon any of the 
aforementioned special payments in the last year of service. 
49-9-17, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
4- Compensation was and continues to be defined as the total 
amount of payments made by an employer to an employee for services 
rendered to an employer. 
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5- In implementing these statutes prior to 1985, the retirement 
board, by resolution, established a policy whereby retirement contribu-
tions would be withheld only upon employment compensation related to 
the member's normal occupation, and not upon totally unrelated employ-
ment compensation. Refunds of "secondary" employment contributions 
were made available upon a showing of the unrelated nature of the dual 
employment. (See plaintiffs' Exhibit A). 
6- In 1984, the Legislature enacted legislation designed to 
reward teachers for extra work done. This concept, known as "Teacher 
Career Ladders" 53-54-1, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, raised concerns over 
the treatment of this particular type of teacher compensation for extra 
work done, both in terms of its inclusion in the calculation of the 
final average salary and as to whether contributions should be made 
thereon. In November, 1984, the retirement board passed a resolution 
governing this uncertainty, establishing that retirement contributions 
were to be made only on the primary employment compensation of a member. 
In the case of a teacher, primary employment was to be determined by 
the primary contract. All secondary employment unrelated to the primary 
contract, such as career ladder programs, summer school, night school, 
coaching, or other extra curricular assignments for which compensation 
is paid would not be subject to retirement contributions. (See 
plaintiffs' Exhibit B). 
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7- At the time of these apparent difficulties in determining which 
compensation should be subject to retirement contributions and which 
compensation qualifies for inclusion in the "final average salary" 
computation, the Legislature was informed of the need to harmonize the 
current statutes and clarify legislative intent with regard to these 
two definitions. 
8- In response to this request, the 1985 Legislature enacted House 
Bill 299, "Retirement Law Amendments," effective March 16, 1985, 
which established the compensation upon which the final average salary 
would be calculated. The new definition, found in 49-10-6(22), U.C.A. 
1953, as amended, defined compensation as the total amount of payments 
made by an employer to an employee for services rendered to the employer 
which by its nature is subject to Social Security deductions, including 
any payments in excess of the maximum amount subject to deduction under 
Social Security law, (emphasis added) 
9- Once again the retirement board adopted a resolution governing 
the implementation of the definition of compensation. In May, 1985, the 
retirement board determined (a) that refunds on contributions for dual or 
supplemental service accrued prior to the effective date of the act was 
not authorized by statute; (b) that any such refund would place the 
retirement system in an actuarially unsound position, a position con-
trary to the mandate of the legislature established under 49-9-3(6), and 
49-10-1, U.C.A. 1953, as amended; and (c) that the new definition 
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afforded all members an opportunity to receive a benefit based on all 
service and salary reported at the time of retirement, which would be 
an increased benefit at the time of retirement for the plaintiffs, 
because retirement calculations would be based on all service upon 
which contributions have been made. 
10- Provisions and forms governing the refund of contributions 
made on employment compensation which does not qualify for the addition-
al retirement benefits granted by House Bill 299 do currently exist and 
are available from the retirement board. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
EXISTING RETIREMENT STATUTES GOVERN THE PLAINTIFFS' 
RIGHTS TO A REFUND OF CONTRIBUTIONS MADE ON SECONDARY 
EMPLOYMENT INCOME. 
Section 49-9-19(2), U.C.A. 1953, as amended, states, "No refund 
may be made to an active member of any retirement system administered 
by the board unless the board determines that the member has service 
credit, which, if calculated on its own, would render that member 
ineligible for membership in the retirement system." 
Plaintiffs' have failed to note this provision. Read in harmony 
with the new definition of compensation under House Bill 299, 1985 
General Session, it is crystal clear that the retirement board has no 
authority to refund any contribution based on any secondary employment 
compensation unless (a) that income alone would render the member 
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ineligible for membership in the system, and (b) that compensation is, 
by its nature, not subject to social security deductions. As applied 
by the retirement board to teachers in general, and to these plaintiffs 
in particular, work which is considered as a support service, which is 
capable of being performed by a member of the public at large, is con-
sidered to be secondary unrelated employment and, as such, any applicant 
is eligible for a refund of contributions made on that secondary employ-
ment. To illustrate, a teacher who entered into a contract to do some 
general maintenance work and painting, may seek a refund of any retire-
ment contributions made on income from that contract. (49-9-19(2), 
U.C.A. 1953, as amended - [see Exhibit "A11 attached] This procedure 
is presently in force at the retirement office. 
In the alternative, if the contribution was "by its nature 
subject to social security deductions'1 then any such compensation is 
eligible for inclusion in determining the "final average salary" of 
the member. By adopting the social security standard for determining 
compensation, the legislature significantly enhanced the retirement 
benefit for all employees with certain types of dual service by allow-
ing additional employment outside the normal primary employment to 
qualify for determining the final average salary. 
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II 
THE LEGISLATURE'S DEFINITION OF THE TERM "COMPENSATION" 
AND THE RETIREMENT BOARD'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS 
DEFINITION DO NOT VIOLATE PLAINTIFFS1 RIGHTS TO 
EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. 
The very nature of a defined retirement benefit plan is such that 
contribution rates and benefits are subject to legislative amendment. 
Contrary to plaintiff's contention, but in complete accord with their 
statutory and case law citations, the legislature has treated similarly 
situated individuals in a similar manner. Constitutional Law, Nowar, 
Rotunda and Young (1978), P. 383. All those members who have dual 
employment and have paid contributions on secondary employment which 
would, by its nature, be subject to social security deductions will 
have an increased final average salary for retirement calculation 
purposes. This is the first class of members. The second class is 
comprised of all those members who have dual employment and have paid 
contributions on secondary employment which standing alone, would 
render the member ineligible for membership in the system and which, 
by its nature, is not subject to social security deductions. Members 
of the second class are eligible for a refund of those contributions 
made on secondary employment income and will not have the second 
employment income used in calculating the final average salary for 
retirement purposes. Thus there is a legitimate, rational distinction 
between these two classes. One class pays more in contributions and 
receives a greater retirement benefit. 
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A similar situation of classification arose in Utah in Hansen vs. 
Public Employees'Retirement System Board of Administration, 246 P.2d 
591 (Utah 1952). In that case, the Legislature, in providing for the 
liquidation of the state retirement system, differentiated, for benefit 
purposes, between members with ten or more years service and members 
with less than ten years service, thus granting different and enhanced 
benefits to one of the two different groups of members who were 
"similarly situated." 
The Court upheld this legislative classification against a simi-
lar challenge based on equal protection violations under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and held: "An act is never unconstitutional because of 
discrimination so long as there is some reasonable basis for differ-
entiation between classes which is related to the purposes to be 
accomplished by the act. And it applies uniformly to all persons with-
in the class." ]d^ at 598. 
The Hansen Court opined that there is a rational basis for dif-
ferentiating between members of a retirement system based on length 
of service. Other important factors in classification were "admin-
istrative convenience and expense." Jki. 
Similarly in the case at hand, the Legislature made a classifica-
tion, not on the basis of length of service performed, but on the basis 
of the type of employment performed. 
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The affidavit of the retirement director establishes that an enor-
mous expense may be involved in providing for refunds, which will lead 
to immense administrative inconvenience, both factors used by the Court 
in upholding the legislative classification in Hansen. 
It appears that plaintiffs1 problems rest not with the 
Legislature's redefinition of "compensation11 in 1985, but with the 
fact that they could not take advantage of the change in law without 
retiring. (Plaintiffs1 Memo P.2) This raises the question of whether 
the Legislature may enact laws which affect a change in retirement 
member rights. In Driggs v. Utah State Teachers' Retirement Board, 
142 P.2d 657 (Utah 1943). The Utah Supreme Court had occasion to 
review a legislative enactment which affected a member's "vested" 
right to retirement and cautioned, "It should be noted that until all 
of the conditions are fulfilled, the pensioner's right is inchoate and 
not vested." Iji. at 663. 
Similarly here, the plaintiffs' can hardly claim that the refund 
is a vested right or that they have a right to have the secondary 
income included in the final average salary computation. They have 
not met all the conditions of retirement and so their claims are not 
rights. 
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the right to a 
refund or to have the secondary income included in final average salary 
determination is a vested right, the legislature provided a substantial 
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substitute for the change resulting from House Bill 299, which allows 
additional secondary compensation to be included in the final average 
salary computation thus increasing the final retirement benefit. This 
substantial substitute by the legislature meets the requirements 
established in Newcombe v. Ogden City Public School Teachers' Retirement 
Commission, 243 P.2d 941 (Utah 1952), where the court held that the 
Legislature may not terminate a retirement system (a vested right to 
the retirant) unless a substantial substitute is provided. 
CONCLUSION 
The 1985 Legislature recognized that the existing laws surrounding 
the computation of final average salary, particularly in light of the 
varying interpretations of what compensation is to be used in the cal-
culation thereof, were unfair and confusing. By adopting the social 
security standard for determining compensation to be used in the cal-
culation of final average salary, the Legislature resolved the apparent 
conflicts. In doing so, the Legislature provided an additional bene-
fit for those who retire under the system, a benefit to be paid by 
contributions already made by members of the system. This is consistent 
with state statutory and case law, and is in the best interest of all 
members of the system. It is not violative of either Fourteenth 
Amendment Right to Equal Protection under the Laws or any right to 
retirement held by the plaintiffs under the system. Plaintiffs are 
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seeking both the new benefit provided by the legislature, and a refund 
of contributions upon which that new benefit is based. This motion 
should be denied, and the retirement board's motion for summary 
judgment should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
dutA^^ 
1arw A. Madsen 
Attorney for Defendant 
Utah State Retirement Board 
Received copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs* Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit of Bert D. Hunsaker 
on this 2nd day of June, 1987. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATION OF SECONDARY EARNINGS 
(Not Subject to Retirement Contributions) 
Utah State Retirement Office 
TO BE OOMPLETED BY THE EMPLOYER TO CERTIFY EXCESS EARNINGS OVER THE PRIMARY 
CONTRACT UPCN WHICH RETIREMENT CONTRIBUTIONS HAVE BEEN PAID. 
Unit Number: 
Unit Name: 
Member's Name: 
Social Security Number: 
Member's Position: 
[OFFICE USE ONLY: 
bnit Refund Date 
Salaries Checked 
Processed By-
Reviewed By 
E. V. Typed 
Year 
To Be Completed By Bnployer 
Wages for Primary 
Employment 
(contract amount)\ 
—
a
 ' — .-i_-.il .11 -.- .jj.- ... 
. 
i 
i 
i 
Wages for Refundable 
Secondary Deployment 
Total 
Employment 
j 
1111
 - — ' ' * * " " • • ' ' " • " " • ' " - • — f - - • ' - L J 
i 
. _ _ _ _ j 
i 
• 
I 
» 
Please list secondary job position/s of member (Secondary employment is 
employment not covered by primary contract and will not have retirement 
contributions withheld on these earnings). 
I certify that the above information is correct. 
Authorized Signature: Job Title: Date: 
RETIREMENT LAW AMENDMENTS 
1985 
GENERAL SESSION 
Enrolled Copy 
H. B. No. 299 By Rob W. Bishop 
AN ACT RELATING TO PENSIONS AND THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT; 
DEFINING COMPENSATION AND FINAL AVERAGE SALARY; EXEMPTING 
CERTAIN APPOINTED BOARDS FROM PARTICIPATION IN THE SYSTEM; 
PROVIDING A 60 DAY WAITING PERIOD FOR A REFUND OF 
CONTRIBUTIONS; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS 
FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
49-9-17, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 22, LAWS OF UTAH 1976 
49-10-6, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 224, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
49-10-14, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 42, LAWS OF UTAH 1984 
49-10-24, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 106, LAWS OF UTAH 1967 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 49-9-17, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
enacted by Chapter 22, Lavs of Utah 1976, is amended to read: 
49-9-17. In the administration of the -state retirement 
systems assigned to the Utah State Retirement Office for 
administration, the following policies[7--a»eng—ethers—ehaii] 
apply: 
(a) Final average salary used in the computation of a 
retirement benefit shall be based upon the fixed compensation 
regularly paid to the member over the period of time specified 
in the retirement system act under which the benefit is being 
computed. It shall not include (everfc*me7-deuB4e-fc*me7-er) 
terminal lump-sum payments, accumulated lump-sum vacation or 
sick leave payments, severance pay, bonuses, or any other 
special payments including early retirement inducements, except 
H. B. No. 299 
as provided to the contrary in the laws governing the separate 
retirement systems, nor shall the contributions paid by the 
employer and employee to the retirement systems be based upon 
any of the aforementioned special payments in the last year of 
service. 
(b) This policy on the computation of final average salary 
shall take precedence over any and all definitions of final 
average salary included in any and all state retirement system 
acts administered by the Utah State Retirement Office. 
Section 2. Section 49-10-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 224, Laws of Utah 1983, is amended to 
read : 
49-10-6. Unless a different meaning is plainly required 
by the context, as used in this chapter: 
(1) "Retirement system" or "system" means the Utah State 
Retirement System created by this act. 
(2) "Department" means any department, office, board, 
commission, instrumentality, or other agency of the state of 
Utah. 
(3) "Educational institution" means a political 
subdivision or instrumentality of the state or of a political 
subdivision or of a combination thereof primarily engaged in 
educational activities or the administration or servicing 
(fehereef) of educational activities, including but not limited 
to the State Board of Education and [ afty-inefcrtuweFifeaiifcy 
%hereef] its instrumentalities, any institution of higher 
learning and its branches, any school district and 
(4»e%rttJ!ie»teai±%y-fehereef ] its instrumentalities, vocational and 
technical schools, and [any—eense£±da**en--er] any entity 
arising out of a consolidation agreement |fehereef) between 
entities under this definition. 
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(4) "Political subdivision" means any political 
subdivision of the state, including but not limited to citiea, 
towns, counties, and school districts, but only if the 
subdivision is a juristic entity which is legally separate and 
distinct from the state and only if its employees are not by 
virtue of their relations to the entity employees of the state 
or one of its departments. The term includes special districts 
or authorities created by the Legislature or by local 
governments such as, but not limited to, mosquito abatement 
districts, sewer or water districts, water associations and 
companies, libraries, and I any—eense£*dafe£en-er] any entity 
arising out of a consolidation agreement [ef] between political 
subdivisions. The term does not include a project entity 
created under Chapter 13, Title 11[7—*The—interieeai 
Ge-epe*rafe±©n-Aefc-r2 }JL It includes the Utah State Retirement 
Office I e*feateed-by-ehapfeer-?47-fcawe-ef-y%ah-i9637-ae-ame»de€l] -
(5) "Organization or agency financed in whole or in part 
by public funds" means an agency, association, or organization 
which receives public funds. The term does not include 
political subdivisions, departments, or educational 
institutions. 
"Public funds" means funds derived from public taxes or 
public revenue either directly or indirectly, dues or 
contributions paid or donated by the membership of the 
organization, used to finance an activity whose objective is to 
improve on a nonprofit basis the governmental, educational, and 
social programs and systems of the state or its political 
subdivisions generally. These organizations shall be entitled 
to participation under |%he-prev*e*ene-e*] this chapter at the 
discretion of the board upon application for coverage of their 
employees. 
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(6) "Employer" or "employing unit" means any department, 
educational institution, political subdivision, (e*| 
organization, or agency financed in whole or in part by public 
funds for which any employee or member performs »*rvices 
subject to (fche-prev±s±ens-ef) this chapter. 
(7) "Participating employer" or "participating unit" means 
any employer or employing unit participating in the Utah State 
Retirement System and whose employees are members of the 
system. 
(8) "Employee" or "regular employee" means any regular 
full-time employee whose term of employment for an employer 
contemplates continued employment during a calendar or school 
year and who performs covered service for one or more 
employers. It means an officer, elective or appointive, but 
excluding any member of the [Hfeah] Legislature if [he--eheHid 
eheesej the legislator chooses to be excluded, who receives as 
compensation from an employer $30 or more per month. An 
"appointive officer" means a person appointed to a position for 
a definite and fixed term of office by official and duly 
recorded action of the governing body of a covered unit. 
(9) "Regular full-time employee," in qualifying for 
membership in the system, means an employee whose employment 
normally requires 30 hours or more per week, or a person 
employed in a position requiring 20 hours or more per week for 
a minimum period of nine consecutive months except as may be 
modified by the board. It includes a teacher who teaches 
half-time or more. Full-time students or the wife of a 
full-time student and persons employed in a trainee 
relationship may be excluded from coverage by regulation of the 
board. Credit for service shall be granted in proportion to 
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the work performed under [sweh ] rules (as] the board may adopt. 
(10) "Member" means any person included in the membership 
of the retirement system as provided [herein] in this chapter. 
A member who lias received no compensation as defined in this 
section fci a period longer than foui months is considered an 
inactive member 
(11) "Board" or "retirement board" means the Utah State 
Retirement Board | e5fea£ed-by-ehapfeei?-:?47-feaw8-e£-Vfcah-i9637--afl 
amended; 
(12) "Retirement office" means the retirement office 
created by chapter 74, Laws of Utah 1963[7-aa-amended]. 
(13) "Administrator" or "executive officer" means the 
executive director appointed by the Utah State Retirement Board 
[ ae-pr©Vided-by-ehapfeer-?47-kaw©-©f-yfcah-£9637-as-aj«eneled] . 
(14) "Retirement fund" means the Utah State Employees' 
Retirement Fund | pjfev*ded-£et-heife±n j . 
(15) "Teimi nation date" means midnight June 30, 1967. 
(16) "Terminated funds" means the Utah School Employees' 
Retirement Fund and the Utah Public Employees' Retirement Fund, 
both terminated by this chapter. 
(17) "Terminated systems" means the Utah School Employees' 
Retirement System and the Utah Public Employees' Retirement 
System, both terminated by this |aetj chapter. 
(18) "Service" or "covered service" means service rendered 
to an employer for compensation which is included in 
computations relating to membership status or benefit rights 
undei thi*= chapter including service in the armed forces of the 
United States In no case shall a retirement allowance or 
other benefit be granted under this chapter which is based upon 
the same service as has been the basis for retirement benefits 
under some other Utah public letirement system. 
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(19) "Current service" means covered service rendered on 
or after July 1, 1967. 
(20) "Prior service" means service rendered pnoi to July 
1, 1967, which is creditable in the system (here±H] created by 
this chapter. 
(21) "Years of service" oi "seivice years" means the 
number of periods, each to consist of 12 full months or as 
determined by the board, whether consecutive or not, during 
which an employee performed services for an employer oi 
employers, including [snek] any time |as] the employee rendered 
service in the armed forces of the United States before 
membership in the system or was absent on a paid le?/e of 
absence granted by an employer or absent in the service of the 
United States government on military duty as |here±na€£e*| 
provided by this chapter. For a teacher, school administrator, 
or other contract employee of an educational institution not 
less than nine months of full-time service fsha£i--eenate±fe«%e] 
constitutes a seivice year. Members shall be credited with any 
fractions of years of service to which they may be entitled. 
(22) "Compensation," "salary," or "wages" means the total 
amount of payments made by an employer to an employee for 
services rendered to the employer [ 7-£ne£Hel±ng7-fcttfc-ne£-by-way 
e€-£*witatiew:-a£i-ea£atyr--wage--and--avert±me--payments bwfc 
exeiweltna- ] which by its nature is subject to social security 
deductions, including^any payments in excess of the maximum 
amount subject to deduction under social security law. 
"Compensation," "salary," oi "wages" does not _include: (a) 
the monetary value of remuneration paid in kind, such as 
residence or u^e of equipment; {and J (b) all contributions 
made by an employer under this plan oi undei any othei employee 
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benefit plan maintained by an employer for the benefit of a 
participant; (c_}_ salary paid to an employee working under the 
minimum number of hours required for membership; (d) a 
temporary cr exempt employee as defined fcy this section or 
Section 49-10-14, or (e) terminal lump sum payments, 
accumulated lump sum vacation, sick leave payments, severance 
PsLY or any other__sp_ec i a_l _p_ayments including early retirement 
inducements. 
(23) "Final average salary" means the rate of the average 
highest annual compensation payable to a member for any five 
yeais preceding retirement. For purposes of computing the 
member's final average salary only, the member is considered to 
have been in service at his last salary rate from the date of 
the termination of employment to the date (k*a] retirement 
becomes effective if the member so requests If participating 
service is less than five years, then "final average salary" 
means the average annual compensation paid to the member during 
'the full period of participating service. [Jt-dees-ncfc-tneiwde 
£©*--atty--memteei?--eempen8a%*©n-reee*veel-# ©r-either-pajrfc-tame-e* 
9pee*ai--«5e«rv±ee--jreHdet-eeJ--tH een^tmetsen w±tk £wi£-t*me 
emp± © ymehfc--Hn£eas-e©nfc**l»Hfcien8 -have -seen- pa *el-©tt-e©mpeneafc±©ft 
tet"»ived-fet-sweh--ael«iitteftei--8eFV4ee- j The "final average 
salary" is limited in the computation of that part of a 
membei's prioi service retirement allowance based on service 
rendered during a period when the |ea*d] member received 
employer contributions on a portion of his compensation from an 
edirationa. institution toward the payment of the premium 
required en a retirement annuity contract with the Teachers' 
Insurance and Annuity Association of America or with any other 
public or private system, organization or company to $4,800. 
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This limitation is not applicable to membeis who elected to 
continue in the state retnement system by July 1 1967 The 
retirement boaid shall, before July 1, 1979, adjust the 
retirement allowance of any member who retired before July 1 
1979 "Average final monthly salary" means one-tweifth of the 
final average salary. 
(24) "Participating service" means senice rendered during 
which a person was a member of this system as well as either of 
the terminated systems during which [he] the person was paid 
compensation upon which member contributions were taken 
(25) "Refund" means a termination of service and the 
application for and receipt of a member's accumulated 
contributions by the terminated member A "withdrawal of 
contributions" means the application for and receipt of the 
balance of the member's accumulated contributions from the 
terminated Utah Teachers' Retirement Systeir without a 
termination of service as permitted in the Utah School 
Employees' Retirement Act in 1953 
(26) "Payroll" includes register wan ants, and any other 
documents upon which all persons receiving salary payments are 
listed 
(27) "Retirement" means withdrawal from active service 
Vwith a retirement allowance granted under [*he--p*evie*ene--e£] 
this chapter 
(28) "Actuarial equivalent" means a benefit oi equal value 
when computed upon the basis of (sweh] mortality tables |as 
shaii-be] adopted by the retirement board and regular interest 
(29) "Regular interest" means interest compounded annually 
at (AHchl a rate (as-shflii-have-beewj adopted bj tne Retirement 
Board in accordance with [fehe-p*ev*s±ens-ef) this chapter 
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(30) "Contributions" means the contributions by both the 
employing units and the members into the Retirement Fund. 
(31) "Accumulated contributions" of a member means the sum 
of the contributions made by or on behalf of a member and 
standing to the credit of his individual account together with 
regular interest thereon. 
(32) "Beneficiary" means any person entitled to receive a 
retirement allowance or any other benefit provided by this 
chapter. 
(33) "Dependent beneficiary" means a spouse, [a] child, or 
children under 21 years of age, a physically or mentally 
handicapped child or children, regardless of age, or a parent 
or person regardless of age or relationship, who is or are 
financially dependent upon the member. The dependency of a 
peison othei than a spouse or child shall be proved by written 
verified documents acceptable to the Retirement Board or by a 
copy of the member's state income tax report for the last 
reportable year listing the person as a dependent. All 
documents are sub3ect to review and approval of the retirement 
adrr misti ator. 
(34) "Disability" means the total and permanent incapacity 
of a membei to perform the usual duties of his employment with 
an employer. (Sweh] The incapacity is considered to exist when 
a physician or a board of physicians appointed by the board 
certify that upon the best medical information [enehj the 
disability will be of an extended and indefinite duration. 
(35) "Retirant" means a retired member who is receiving 
retirement benefits. 
(36) "Normal retirement age" means the [afcfea±neci] age of 
65 years. 
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(37) Ages of both members and beneficiaries used in the 
calcalations of allowances shall be taken to the next lower 
completed quarter year. 
(38) "Annuity" means annual payments for life derived from 
the accumulated contributions of the member. 
(39) "Pensions" means annual payments for life derived 
from contributions made by the state |e£-yfcahl or by employers 
(40) "Allowance" and "retirement allowance" means the 
"annuity" plus the "pensions." The retirement allowance shall 
be computed and paid on a monthly basis. 
(41) "Effective date" means 12:01 a.m. July 1, 1967. 
Section 3. Section 49-10-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 42, Laws of Utah 1984, is amended to 
read: 
49-10-14. The following employees are excluded from 
membership in the retirement system: 
(a) Every employee whose employment status is temporary in 
nature due to the nature or the type of w:rk to be performed 
If tne term of employment exceeds six months, then for |sweh| 
that employee a regular full-time status shall be assumed, and 
[he1 the employee shall be enrolled in the system effective on 
the first day of the month of or following the month in which 
[he ] the employee begins (h*s) the sixth month of employment, 
whichever is earlier. If the same employee, previously 
terminated prior to enrollment as a member, is again employed 
within three months of termination by the same employer, [he] 
the employee shall be immediately enrolled as a member if |h»e] 
the work constitutes full-time as defined therein] ij}___this 
chapter. 
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(b) School employees who are normally students and are 
normally enrolled more than half time as a student in an 
educational institution. 
(c) E*ery employee of a two-year or four-year college, or 
university who is the holdei. of a retirement annuity contract 
wit.: the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association of America 
01 with any otnei public 01 private system, organization, or 
company shall be excluded from participation in the system as a 
contiibutmg member during any period in which [He] that 
employee has received or elects to receive contributions toward 
the premiums required thereon from [htsj the employing unit on 
compensation as defined in Subsection 49-10-6 (20). [Every 
sweh| The employee, upon the cessation of [ stieh ] employer 
contributions shall [#erfchw*fch] immediately become a 
contributing memoer. When a retirement allowance is computed 
for a member who nas credit for segments of service in the 
cy. tern, bioken by participating membership in an annuity or 
other organizations as cited m this paragraph, each segment of 
ser-'ice shall have an allowance computed as though each segment 
weie all the service for which the member had credit [£er]. 
Alliances thus computed shall be added together for payment 
(d) E*ery employee serving as an exchange employee from 
outside the state 
(e) Elected officials and members of the [Utah] 
Legislature who file a formal request to be excluded from 
coverage 
(f) Executive department heads , members of the State Tax 
Comrnssion the Public Service Commission, and other memoers of 
full-time :i part-time boards or commission? who file a formal 
request tc be excluded from coverage. 
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I{*}I (9) Persons appointed as city managers 01 chiei city 
administrators or other peisons employed by a city, tcv.T. 
county, or other political subdivision, who are net entitled tc 
merit or civil service protection. Persons eligible foi 
exclusion under this subsection must file a formal request foi 
exclusion from coverage and be employed in a position 
designated as exempt under an employee exemption plan developed 
by the city, town, county, or political subdivision. Employee 
exemption plans shall be subject to the following limitations 
(1) The total number of positions a city town, county, 01 
political subdivision may exempt may not exceed the lesser of 
15 positions or a number equal to 10% of the employees of the 
city, town, county, or political subdivision. However, every 
city, town, county, or political subdivision is entitled to a 
minimum exemption of one eligible employee. 
(n) Employee exemption plans shall be filed annually with 
the retirement office, and the city, town, county, or political 
suodivision shall update the exemption plan m the event of any 
change. 
The retirement cffice is authorized to develop and 
promulgate rules [a«a *egtt±a%±ens ] to implement this 
subsection. 
I fg-H (h) Members who are eligible for exclusion fior 
participation undei Subsections (e), \&n4\ (f), _an: _i2j ana whe 
are delinquent in required contributions for any period prior 
to July 1, 1984, shall have the option of
 vi) bringing current 
their delinquent contributions and accrued interest for an^ 
period prior to July 1, 1984, plus payment of a 2-1 2°c 
administrative fee or (n) not bringing current delinquent 
contributions an~ accrued interest, and permanently forfeiting 
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all service ciedits which would have been earned during the 
period for which contributions were not made. No participating 
employer shall be required to bring current delinquent 
contributions and accrued interest owing on behalf of any 
merrbei eligible fci exclusion undei Subsections (e), [and] (f)^ 
and (g) who was delinquent for any period prior to July 1, 
1984, except as requested by the member | puirswanfc--fee) under 
this subsection 
Section 4 Section 49-10-24, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
enacted by Chapter 106, Laws of Utah 1967, is amended to read: 
49-10-24. If a member shall for any cause, except 
retirement, permanent or temporary disability, or death, cease 
to be employed in covered services for an employer (he] then 
the member may: 
(a) By signing a written request, affirming therein that 
the member _has neither applied for, nor contemplates further 
employment with a covered unit, and directing the request 
|d**ee%ed] to tne retirement office^ receive a refund of all 
|h±ej accumulated contributions, less a withdrawal fee the 
amount of which the retirement board shall establish by 
If^HHiatteh) rule foi the purpose of reimbursing its 
<r>drr MII s t rati ve fund for the cost entailed by j sa±el ] the 
withdrawal A disbursement of the refund shall not be made 
sooner than 60 days from the last day paid. Notwithstanding 
the writtei. request, if a member who has requested a refund 
a ex epts e rr ployment with another covered unit within the 60-day 
period, the roejnoe r _sh a_l 1 _i nform the retirement office 
immediately. In the event of [such] this election, a 
terminating employee^ upon later re-employment by an employer 
under [fche--p*ev±s*©ns-©£j this (aefcj chapter, unless [he] the 
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employee redeposits [his] the refund as (hereto J permitted by 
this section, shall be treated as a new employee and (his] the 
employee's service history and benefit rights shall then be 
based upon current services from the date of [said] 
re-employment in covered services. 
(b) Leave (h±e) the employee's account in the fund intact. 
In the event of [sweh] this election, a terminating employee 
shall retain status as a member of the system, (eneeptiHef] 
except for the lack of contributions paid into the fund by 
[himj the employee or on fhis] the employee's behalf. In the 
event of (his] re-employment by an employer for services 
covered by this act, (hie] the employee's service history and 
benefit rights shall be based upon the prior service credit and 
current service credit accredited to (him J the employee at the 
time of [hial the employee's most recent termination of 
employment, as well as upon the current service credit that (he 
aeqHtyes) is acquired as the result of [h*si re-employment. 
Upon the attainment of retirement age, an inactive member 
(shaii--have] has the same rights to ,teeetve] retirement 
benefits, if so eligible (fchere£er], as any active employee 
member. 
Section 5. This act takes effect upon approval by the 
governor, or the day following the consti tu _ti on a. 1 11 me l_im it_ o f 
Article VII, Sec. 8 without the governor's signature or in the 
case of a veto, the date of veto override. 
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